Philosophy and History of Science and Technology

TAMUCC Philosophy and History of Science and Technology Don Berkich
Philosophy Lakatos' Demarcation Criteria Notes

Recall that for Popper, a scientific theory is either

  1. An interpreted formal logic, or,
  2. A mixed formal and informal language which can nevertheless be expressed as an interpreted formal logic.

Thus if a theory T is a science, then

  • T is neither provable nor probable.
  • T is falsifiable such that possibly there is some state of affairs with which S conflicts and hence, by the fundamental theorem of logic, at least one of the members of P is false.
  • Experiments are designed to refute T, not confirm it.
  • Observations count as confirmation of T only when S is a 'risky' or surprising prediction and the observations bear out that S is true.

Yet if T is a pseudoscience, then

  • Adherents to T seek confirmation, rarely or never refutation.
  • Either T cannot be expressed as an interpreted formal logic or adherents to T avoid expressing it as an interpreted formal logic.

Contrast Popper with Kuhn. A scientific theory for Kuhn is nothing so formal as Popper takes it to be. Instead it is a paradigm, very roughly the totality of propositions a community of scientists adopt which guide and constrain what counts as legitimate inquiry within the community. We shall have much to say about Kuhn's notion of a paradigm later. For now, think of a kuhnian paradigm as a conceptual scheme or a set of social values and beliefs shared by the community of scientists.

If, for Kuhn, paradigm P is a science, then

  • P generates puzzles in a puzzle solving tradition which can usefully be solved by the members of the community converted to P.
  • Failure to solve puzzles using the resources of a normal science eventually results in extraordinary science or scientific revolutions during which time members of the community undergo a conversion to a new paradigm.

If, on the other hand, P is a pseudoscience, then

  • P fails to generate puzzles, or have a puzzle solving tradition, or have a community of puzzle solvers.

In contrast to both Popper and Kuhn, Lakatos views scientific theories as research programs. What is a research program for Lakatos?

A scientific research program consists of the totality of propositions which define and unify a research program, regardless of whether the propositions can be expressed in an interpreted formal logic. The totality of propositions consists of

  1. A core set of basic or bedrock assumptions;
  2. A "protective belt" of propositions which serve to explain, interpret, and justify the basic assumptions of the research program;
  3. An enveloping cluster of methodological and heuristic propositions pertaining to how the propositions of the protective belt are to be applied in the laboratory and the field; and,
  4. The totality of implications understood as predictions and explanations generated by the protective belt as guided by the heuristics of the research program.

Lakatos' notion of a scientific theory as a research program thus combines some of the logical features of Popper's conception with Kuhn's broader vision of an interdependent web of scientific propositions.

If, for Lakatos, a research program R is a science, then

  • R is progressive insofar as it predicts novel facts.
  • R is competitive with any alternate research programs in terms of relative progressivity.

On the other hand, if R is a pseudoscience, then

  • R is either non-progressive or degenerative with respect to its capacity to predict novel facts; or
  • R is not progressive relative to another research program, whatever R's other merits.

Hence Popper is wrong, Lakatos maintains, to think that the goal of science is falsification. In this regard, Kuhn is right in thinking that the history of science shows that scientists do not strive to reject theories. Indeed, they do everything they can to preserve the bedrock assumptions in light of recalcitrant phenomena. Yet Kuhn is mistaken in thinking that science does not fundamentally progress apart from success in puzzle-solving. Where science predicts novel, surprising facts, science can be distinguished from pseudoscience and understood as making progress towards understanding the world.