Case E

Theodore and Victoria Raleigh are self-made millionaires living in Chicago's Gold Coast neighborhood. Theodore is a lawyer specializing in corporatemergers and acquisitions. Victoria is an M.D. with a Ph.D. in microbiology. She works for BioSys, Inc., a biotechnology company. BioSys specializes in reproductive screening and genetic counseling. Currently they are working under Victoria's direction to capitalize on the Human Genome Project with tests for genetic disease factors. They also have a reproductive technologies division headed by Dr. Franz Kronenberg. Franz and Victoria have become close friends and often spend their lunchtimes together discussing their latest research.

Theodore and Victoria have a 12 year old son, Teddy Jr. Teddy Jr. is the joy of Theodore and Victoria's life. They have no plans to have any more children.

Tragically, however, Teddy Jr. is accidentally shot and killed at a friend's house while playing with his friend's father's handgun. Theordore and Victoria are understandably stricken by the loss of their son. After a required autopsy they have the boy's remains cremated. After a few weeks Theodore and Victoria seek therapy to try to come to terms with their loss. It helps somewhat, but their lives remain shattered. Theodore has difficulty pursuing his cases with any vigor, while Victoria throws herself into her work to try and forget. Although neither blames the other for what happened, they spend less and less time with each other to the point where it becomes obvious that their marriage may not survive.

Franz watches all of this with growing concern. One day at lunch he decides to broach the topic with Victoria.

"Vic, I know it's none of my business, but I've noticed that things between you and Ted don't seem to be going very well," he offered.

"No, they haven't," Victoria replied. "I just don't think we're ever going to recover from losing Teddy Jr. I thought we would be ok after a while, but it just never seems to get any easier."

"Teddy Jr. was a very special boy, Vic. I guess some things just aren't meant to get any easier."

"Not this one."

"You know, no one can bring Teddy Jr. back, but, but there might be something we can do," Franz hesitantly said.

"What do you mean, exactly?" Victoria asked.

Franz thought for a moment before making Victoria a very serious offer. "Look, you know that we've been exploring a variety of experimental methods for increasing the supply of implantable embryos. One of the techniques we've looked at involves the replacement of an embryo's genetic material. We think we've made some real progress."

"You're talking about cloning, Franz!" Victoria said, somewhat shocked.

"That's right," Franz confirmed. "We think we've got the technology to the point where it can be used on a human embryo. We may not be able to get Teddy Jr. back for you, but we can give you what is in effect Teddy Jr.'s identical twin."

Mulling it over, Victoria said, "You would need Teddy Jr.'s DNA. But he's been cremated."

"True, but an autopsy was performed. I believe blood samples are usually kept for a period of time. That would give us everything we need."

Victoria thanked Franz for his offer and told him that she would consider it. That evening she went home early and told Theodore about her conversation with Franz. They discussed the possibility long into the night. In the end they decided to pursue Franz's suggestion. If Franz's techniques are successful, in nine months Victoria will give birth to Teddy Jr.'s clone.

Question: Is it morally right for Victoria to try to have Teddy Jr.'s clone?

According to KET, one should act

1. Only according to that maxim by which one can at the same time will that it should be universal law.

2. So as to treat humanity, whether in one's own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.

The first formulation of the Categorical Imperative implies that it is morally permissible for Victoria to try to have Teddy Jr's clone since no contradiction can be obtained from the universalization of Victoria's maxim "I should try to have my dead child's clone."

The second formulation of the Categorical Imperative is less clear. It might be argued, for instance, that Victoria's attempt to have Teddy Jr's clone is to treat the clone, call him Teddy-2, as means to an end--that end, presumably, being the recreation of her former family. But notice that the second formulation of the Categorical Imperative does not say: never treat anyone as a means. Rather, it says: always treat people as an end and never as a means ONLY.

For example, if I sell my truck to you I am certainly using you as means--a means to make money. But I am also treating you as an end. You are, after all, taking my truck. Now if I took your money but did not deliver the truck then clearly I would be treating you as a means only, which is of course forbidden by the second formulation. But by delivering my truck you get fair value for your money and the transaction consists of mutually treating each other both as end and, of course, means. But that is permitted by the second formulation.

To show that it is morally permissible for Victoria of try to have Teddy-2 it suffices to show that, even though in doing so she would be treating Teddy-2 as a means, she is treating Teddy-2 as an end in himself. And certainly this is the case. Teddy-2 is nothing more nor less than Teddy Jr's identical twin, born 13 years later than Teddy Jr. It is absurd to think that Victoria would treat Teddy-2 as any less of an end in himself than she would have Teddy Jr's identical twin, since she of all people knows that Teddy-2 really is just Teddy Jr's identical twin.

This really is the crux of the matter. Any argument against Victoria's cloning Teddy Jr. would have to constitute an argument against Victoria's having Teddy Jr's identical twin, had the opportunity so presented itself. But no one could argue on KET grounds that it would have been morally impermissible for Victoria to have Teddy Jr's identical twin. Hence no one can argue on KET grounds that it is morally impermissible for Victoria to try to have Teddy-2.

Whether one considers the first or the second formulation of the categorical imperative, then, it turns out that it is morally permissible for Victoria to try to have Teddy Jr's clone. I conclude, then, that on KET grounds it is clearly morally permissible for Victoria to have Teddy Jr's clone.