Thursday 9/20

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.05-4.128

Discussion Questions

First Question: Communicating Falsely

At 4.062 Wittgenstein carries on a bit of a conversation with an unknown interlocutor:

Can we not make ourselves understood with false propositions just as we have done up till now with true ones?—So long as it is known that they are meant to be false.—No! For a proposition is true if we use it to say that things stand in a certain way, and they do; and if by 'p' we mean ∼p and things stand as we mean that they do, then, construed in the new way, 'p' is true and not false.

What is the argument Wittgenstein uses to reject his interlocutor's suggestion? Is it sound?

Second Question: On Philosophy

After asserting that "[t]he totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the natural sciences)" in 4.11, Wittgenstein goes on to use this assertion as an opportunity to explore, famously, the place of philosophy. Thus,

4.111

a) Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences.

b) (The word 'philosophy' must mean something whose place is above or below the natural sciences, not beside them.)

4.112

c) Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts.

d) Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.

e) A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations.

f) Philosophy does not result in ‘philosophical propositions’, but rather in the clarification of propositions.

g) Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries.

4.1121

h) Psychology is no more closely related to philosophy than any other natural science.

i) Theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology.

4.113

j) Philosophy sets limits to the much disputed sphere of natural science.

What is he asserting about philosophy in each point (a) - (j)? What are some well-chosen examples to illustrate each point? Is he right, in each case?

Third Question: Showing and Saying

In 4.1212 Wittgenstein summarizes his discussion beginning at 4.12 with the enigmatic assertion, "[w]hat can be shown, cannot be said." Explain just how this summarizes his position.