Wednesday 10/16

Wednesday 10/16

Deontology I

Note that we are running slightly behind schedule, so I've included all the readings from last time along with new readings for today's lecture. The cases for application are as before. Indeed, we may not get to Kantian Ethical Theory today, because it is extremely important to get practice applying utilitarian theories to specific cases so as to better grasp their assumptions and the differences between them. We'll do our best to at least explain Kant's argument against utilitarianism, however.

Readings

Texts

Notes

Cases

Synopsis

As predicted, we did not get to any new material today. Instead, we broke out into groups to discuss the application of versions of UET to specific cases. I thought it was a promising day, in the sense that people seemed to catch on quickly to act-utilitarian analyses, at least.

Applying a Utilitarian Ethical Theory like Ideal Act Utilitarianism or Ideal Rule Utilitarianism (for example) to determine the morality of an action is non-trivial, as we discovered today when we took up the cases Body Dysmorphic Disorder and Adolescent Breast Augmentation. Where we stumbled a bit was turning from act-utilitarian approaches to rule-utilitarianism. This is understandable. The specifics of a case tend to welcome an analysis informed by those specifics. Rule analysis is much more abstract inasmuch as it is much more general. To further flesh out the distinction, read the following two applications I wrote as examples.

What one discovers in considering these and other applications of utilitarian theories is that:

  • It is generally much harder to apply a theory than one might imagine; theories are not 'moral calculators' or 'black boxes' that spit out a judgment about an action given sufficient input;
  • Rule-utilitarian theories diverge significantly from act-utilitarian theories in terms of how they are applied. In applying act-utilitarian theories, we compare the utility of an action with the utility of each of its alternatives. In applying rule-utilitarian theories, we compare the total utility of a world as much like this world as possible, except that the rule in question is operative in the world, with the total utility of this, the actual world; and,
  • Different measures of utility--e.g., happiness, pleasure, best interests, or preferences--often result in very different implications for action.

Although it may be challenging to apply these various theories without straying from their basic assumptions, it helps considerably that utilitarian analysis is not alien to us: We do it all the time, we just haven't (until now) thought about it in these terms, or made the sorts of distinctions we must on careful investigation.

Next time we will take up a serious challenge to utilitarianism, one which argues that there is a significant puzzle about the nature of morality at the heart of utilitarianism.