Wednesday, 7/15

Utilitarianism I

Readings

Texts

• J.S. Mill, "Utilitarianism", chapter 1
• J.S. Mill, "Utilitarianism", chapter 2

Notes

• Classical Utilitarianism
• Is Happiness All that Matters?
• Two Principles of Moral Theology

Synopsis

Today we continued our discussion of the view that the morality of an action is a matter not of culture (CER), opinion (SES), God's will (DCT), or the way in which God created the universe (NLT), but the consequences of the action.

Thus, according to Classical Utilitarianism (CU), an action is morally right iff it promotes a greater balance of happiness over unhappiness for the greatest number, considered equally, as any alternative.

We began today by outlining an application of CU to a fairly trivial scenario, using in this case a so-called "Utility Chart" to flesh out and make more precise what CU asserts.

Using that application, we went on to catalog the rather interesting properties of Classical Utilitarianism. We argued in particular that CU's assumption that happiness is the sole intrinsic good (eudaimonism) may be problematic, since it can be argued that happiness is not the sole intrinsic good. Indeed, it would seem that such things as honor and friendship are also intrinsic goods, given our arguments. Responding to this objection often consists of changing the measure of utility. If happiness is not the sole intrinsic good, then we reject happiness as the measure of utility. Possible alternative measures are pleasure (hedonism), kinds of pleasure (qualified hedonism), best interests (idealism), or preferences (preferentialism). By changing how they measure utility, the utilitarian is able to meet the criticism that happiness is not the sole intrinsic good by developing what amount to alternative utilitarian ethical theories to CU. Utilitarianism thus shows us that the idea of utility is rich indeed.

So happiness may not be all that matters, but utilitarianism understood as an approach to developing ethical theory has available to it many alternatives. What all the resulting utilitarian theories share in common, however, is a commitment to the view that morality is fundamentally a matter of consequences. When we ask about the morality of an action, we are really asking whether it has good or bad consequences. Yet we must ask, are consequences really all that matter? Or are there situations where a singular focus on the consequences of an action will get the morality of the action badly wrong?

That is, CU assumes that consequences are all that can be used to determine the morality of an action. Yet this is problematic because it gives rise to the Justice, Rights, and Backward-Looking Reasons arguments, which we explored in depth today.

Clearly, the utilitarian response cannot be to jettison consequentialism, since that would be to give up on the very idea of UET. Next time we explore some of the responses available to utilitarians and begin our exploration of how to analyze specific cases using one or other of the many utilitarian theories.