Boden's Reply

Boden's strategy is two-fold: First, call into question Searle's claim that intentionality is necessarily the result of biochemical processes; Second, locate intentionality in the Chinese Room via the English Reply.

Searle:

• Since Searle-in-the-room does not understand Chinese any more than Searle-not-in-the-room does, it follows that intentionality cannot emerge from the addition of any apparatus that merely implements the rule-governed manipulation of strings of symbols.
• Intentionality is caused by specific biochemical processes, much like photosynthesis or lactation.
• Other processes may be capable of producing intentionality, but the substances implementing those processes must be similar in all relevant causal respects to biological substances--metals and semiconductors won't do.

Boden:

1. Is intentionality exclusively biochemical?

• Searle's analogy between photosynthesis and intentionality is deceptive because
  • We understand how chlorophyll catalyzes the production of carbohydrates at the bio-molecular level, so we have an adequate explanation of the biochemical basis of photosynthesis.
  • Intentionality, unlike photosynthesis, is a slippery philosophical concept about which there is very little agreement.
  • The claim that biochemistry produces intentionality is mysterious, even though it is strictly speaking true. That is, we know that biochemistry produces intentionality, but, unlike photosynthesis, we have no idea how it happens.

• Study of the neurobiological basis of intentionality focuses not on the specific biochemical make-up of neurons but on their capacity to carry information in the form of electro-chemical excitation.
  • It is not the biochemistry of rods and cones in the eye which are relevant to intentionality but their functionality in detecting and transmitting visual information.
  • At least some of the same functionality of detecting and transmitting visual information is shared by various electronic (metal and semiconductor) devices.
  • One substance may be better suited for implementing cognitive (informational) functions than another, but the point is that those informational functions ultimately result in intentionality quite apart from the substances implementing them.

2. Is there no intentionality in the Chinese Room?

• Revisit the Robot Reply
  • Searle's response that Searle-in-the-Robot no more knows Chinese (or even anything whatsoever about the robot's environment) than Searle-in-the-room fails.
  • Computational psychology does not ascribe intentionality to the brain (=Searle-in-the-Robot) but to the entire person. That is, the brain does not understand English, Chinese, or any language. Rather, the brain is the organ that makes it possible for the person to understand English or Chinese. Similarly, the person sees the red apple, not the person's eye. It merely transmits information about light wavelengths, etc.
  • Searle's response to the Robot Reply presupposes that the brain is the person, yet this (as we shall see when we take up the problem of personal identity) is a controversial point.

• Posit the English Reply
  • The instantiation of a program (the rule-book Searle-in-the-room uses) introduces a minimal kind of intentionality.
  • Searle-in-the-room does not understand Chinese, but Searle-in-the-room must understand enough English to follow the instructions in the rule-book.
  • The Chinese Room is not devoid of intentionality, unless computer programs are purely formal or solely syntactic.
  • Computer programs are not, however, purely formal (solely syntactic) because every computer program is procedural. That is, a computer program takes information and causes events to occur depending on the information it has. At this level of description, the computer program must include at least some semantic content to be correctly characterized.