The Traditional Problem of Freedom of Will
We may cast the problem of freedom of will as a dilemma:
| The Dilemma of Free Will | |||
| 1 | Either Determinism is true or Determinism is not true. | ||
| 2 | If Determinism is true, then Freedom of Will is impossible. | ||
| 3 | If Determinism is not true, then Freedom of Will is impossible. | ||
| ∴ | 4 | Freedom of Will is impossible. | 1,2&3 |
The problem with the dilemma is that it is unclear how to respond. The first premise is simply an instance of the proposition form,
P or not P
which is tautologous--that is, necessarily true. Premise (1) is apparently untouchable. Nor is it clear, given the following argument, whether we can reject premise (2).
| The Argument from Determinism | |||
| 1 | If Determinism is true, then our actions necessarily have external causes. | ||
| 2 | If Freedom of Will is possible, then at least sometimes we could have done otherwise. | ||
| 3 | If our actions necessarily have external causes, then it is not the case that at least sometimes we could have done otherwise. | ||
| ∴ | 4 | If Determinism is true, then Freedom of Will is impossible. | 1,2&3 |
Note that the above argument assumes a version of Determinism called causal determinism. There are other forms of determinism which we need not pursue at this point, since much the same argument can be given in each case. The upshot is that if Determinism is true, then i) we could not have done otherwise and ii) responsibility for our actions is ultimately not us but the (external) causes of which our actions are but effects.
It's not entirely incorrect to think of the argument as proposing that if the Universe is a gigantic clockwork mechanism, and we are but cogs in the clockworks, then what we do depends not on us but on the movement of the mechanism.
The idea that it is we who determine our actions and nothing else for freedom of will to be possible is also called into question by the following argument, which serves to justify premise (3) of the Dilemma of Free Will:
| The Argument from Indeterminism | |||
| 1 | If Determinism is not true, then events do not have causes. | ||
| 2 | Actions are events. | ||
| 3 | If actions do not have causes, then they are merely spontaneous. | ||
| 4 | If actions are merely spontaneous, then Freedom of Will is impossible. | ||
| ∴ | 5 | If Determinism is not true, then Freedom of Will is impossible. | 1,2,3&4 |
Thus if our actions randomly happen for no reason whatsoever, then they are no more up to us than if we were cogs in a celestial clock.
Either way, the Dilemma is at once imposing and possibly disastrous for many social practices.