Essay 04
Well, I'm late again. So let's make this due Thursday, 9/27. The rest of the instructions are as before.
Recall from Thursday's class we left off without having a satisfactory answer to the third question, "Showing and Saying", in hand:
In 4.1212 Wittgenstein summarizes his discussion beginning at 4.12 with the enigmatic assertion, "[w]hat can be shown, cannot be said." Explain just how this summarizes his position.
Let's take this question as our point of focus for the fourth essay. Wittgenstein's full discussion is relatively brief, starting at 4.12.
4.12
Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it—logical form.
In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world.
4.121
Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them.
What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent.
What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language.
Propositions show the logical form of reality.
4.1211
Thus one proposition 'fa' shows that the object a occurs in its sense, two propositions 'fa' and 'ga' show that the same object is mentioned in both of them.
If two propositions contradict one another, then their structure shows it; the same is true if one of them follows from the other. And so on.
4.1212
What can be shown, cannot be said.
Now consider a skeptic's notes on the above passages:
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4.12 Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it—logical form. |
If propositions are facts in the world just as much as pictures, grooves in a record, or architectural models, then don't they have the logical form of the other facts in the world they represent? And since they are representational, don't they also represent the logical form itself of what is represented? The proposition "the cat is on the mat" represents a state-of-affairs of the ball's being on the block (whether it obtains or not--whether, that is, the cat is on the mat, or in the cat-tree, or in the cupboard, or what have you). Why don't these examples represent, in representing the whole of reality, what they must have in common with the various states-of-affairs they depict so as to depict them? |
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4.12 In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world. |
Why? "The cat is on the mat". Logical form, "aRb". Was that so hard? If the logical form of the world isn't expressible with facts in the world--specifically logical pictures like "not(P and not P)" or "P or not P" or "if P then P" that show form and not content, then how are we able to develop and use logics in the first place? |
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4.121 Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them. |
...oookay. If the fact that the cow is in the field (and not in the barn, say, or on the plate, poor Betsey) is 'mirrored' in a picture of the cow's being in the field, then how is it not represented in the picture? And if propositions are pictures, cannot much the same be said of them? How can something be mirrored in a proposition and not also be represented by it!?!? |
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4.121 What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent. What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language. |
Is not what is reflected in a picture also represented by a picture? What is the distinction between representing and mirroring or reflecting he is on about here? Also, languages are about languages all the time. Consider a German textbook written for native English speakers. Presumably it will have statements in it like "'Schnee ist weiss' means snow is white." We even have textbooks about English written for native English speakers, so that English is at once the object language (the language under examination) and the meta language (the language in which the discussion about the object language is taking place. Cannot what is expressed by means of the object language be expressed in the meta language? |
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4.121 Propositions show the logical form of reality. |
Well, yes, presumably in an ideal language the logical structure of the propositions show the ways in which (other? all?) facts can be arranged, logically. |
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4.1211 Thus one proposition 'fa' shows that the object a occurs in its sense, two propositions 'fa' and 'ga' show that the same object is mentioned in both of them. If two propositions contradict one another, then their structure shows it; the same is true if one of them follows from the other. And so on. |
Thanks for the examples. /s How about, "John is tall" and "John is a senior". Yes, dear John is both tall and a senior, we affirm. So the states-of-affairs the propositions assert obtain. And the propositions show that John (the person) is part of both the sense of "John is tall" and "John is a senior." So far so good. |
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4.1212 What can be shown, cannot be said. |
Didn't I (and Wittgenstein) just say what was shown in the example propositions pertaining to 4.1211? So 4.1211 simply contradicts 4.1212 |
Given the skeptic's notes, how might a more charitable interpretation of the passages go so as to rescue Wittgenstein's distinction between showing and saying from the skeptic's caustic remarks? At the end of the day, is it true that what can be shown cannot be said, or is language richer than Wittgenstein imagined, such that what can be shown in it can also be said using it?