Thursday 10/18

Philosophical Investigations, 109-142

Discussion Questions

First Question: Philosophical Inquiry

At 116, Wittgenstein cautions that

116. When philosophers use a word—"knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name"—and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?—What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.

If we consider philosophical inquiry into, say, the nature or essence of knowledge--e.g., the Meno Paradox in Plato's Meno or Ed Gettier's famously brief refutation of the view that knowledge is justified true belief--do we indeed find that philosophers have kidnapped the term from the language-game of its home, permitting all manner of abuse?

Second Question: Aporia

Wittgenstein asserts at (123) that "[a] philosophical problem has the form: "I don't know my way about"."

What especially intrigues one about Wittgenstein's assertion is how it echoes the Ancient Greek notion of aporia: (ᾰ̓πορῐ́ᾱ) from aporos (ἄπορος) or 'without means of passing', 'impassable', in the sense that floods may make a river impassable or snows may make a mountain impassable. More often than not, aporos would be used to describe a river's confounding one's travel. The root matters. For the Ancient Greek 'aporia' would be used to describe, especially in its philosophical context, a puzzle or paradox that sets us back on our heels. We see the problem, but haven't the faintest idea how to proceed--how, that is, to solve the problem so as to get to the other side.

Where Wittgenstein seems to disparage aporia (if that is fair, and it may not be, and if he indeed has in mind something akin to the sense of aporia about which the Ancient Greeks wrote), however, the Ancient Greeks found it the source of great delight and fascination, at least in the guise of Socrates. Consider your favorite example of a philosophical problem which has given rise in you of a sense of aporia. Is Wittgenstein correct that it is (119) "the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense" or is it something to be celebrated for its intrinsically intriguing, curiosity provoking nature?

Third Question: Philosophical Theses

What does Wittgenstein mean when he asserts at (128) that, "[i]f one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them"?

Fourth Question: Different Therapies

How should we take Wittgenstein's point to be when he says in (133) that "[t]here is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies"? By example, what might he have in mind here?

Fourth Question: Climbing the Mountain, or Sliding Down It Backwards?

Under (138) and continue on to the next page under (139), Wittgenstein adds a curious footnote to his discussion. Put together, it reads thusly:

Must I know whether I understand a word? Don't I also sometimes imagine myself to understand a word (as I may imagine I understand a kind of calculation) and then realize that I did not understand it? ("I thought I knew what 'relative' and 'absolute' motion meant, but I see that I don't know.")

(a) "I believe the right word in this case is . . . .". Doesn't this shew that the meaning of a word is a something that comes before our mind, and which is, as it were, the exact picture we want to use here? Suppose I were choosing between the words "imposing", "dignified", "proud", "venerable"; isn't it as though I were choosing between drawings in a portfolio?—No: the fact that one speaks of the appropriate word does not shew the existence of a something that etc.. One is inclined, rather, to speak of this picture-like something just because one can find a word appropriate; because one often chooses between words as between similar but not identical pictures; because pictures are often used instead of words, or to illustrate words; and so on.

(b) I see a picture; it represents an old man walking up a steep path leaning on a stick.—How? Might it not have looked just the same if he had been sliding downhill in that position? Perhaps a Martian would describe the picture so. I do not need to explain why we do not describe it so.

What point is Wittgenstein making here, specifically in light of (b)?