Thursday 9/26
Republic, Book V
Readings
Texts
Discussion Questions
First Question on Book V: Women and Children in the Republic
At the start of Book V, Polemarchus and Adeimantus distract Socrates from concluding his argument on the nature of the City (and the ways in which it can go wrong) and the nature of the Soul (and the ways in which it too, by analogy, can go wrong), wondering at some of the off-hand comments he'd previously made regarding how women and children are to be treated in the City. Socrates protests,
What a thing you’ve done, I said, in stopping me! What an argument you’ve started up again from the very beginning, as it were, about the constitution! I was delighted to think that it had already been described and was content to have these things accepted as they were stated before. You don’t realize what a swarm of arguments you’ve stirred up by calling [b] me to account now. I saw the swarm and passed the topic by in order to save us a lot of trouble.
What is the swarm of arguments to which he refers? Why, indeed, is this particular digression&emdash;as it seems to be in light of the argument at hand&emdash;so prominently placed in the dialogue? That is to ask, what do you think Plato is inviting us to consider here? After all, the emphasis is unmistakable. Socrates himself casts the ensuing discussion thusly,
Your encouragement would be fine, if I could be sure I was speaking with knowledge, for one can feel both secure and confident when one knows the truth about the dearest and most important things and speaks about them among those who are themselves [e] wise and dear friends. But to speak, as I’m doing, at a time when one is unsure of oneself and searching for the truth, is a frightening and [451] insecure thing to do. I’m not afraid of being laughed at—that would be childish indeed. But I am afraid that, if I slip from the truth, just where it’s most important not to, I’ll not only fall myself but drag my friends down as well. So I bow to Adrastea4 for what I’m going to say, for I suspect that it’s a lesser crime to kill someone involuntarily than to mislead people about fine, good, and just institutions. Since it’s better to run this risk among enemies than among friends, you’ve well and truly encouraged me! [b]
Second Question on Book V: The Philosopher King
Glaucon, as so often he does, redirects Socrates somewhat forcefully to focus on whether the City as they've been constructing it in theory could ever exist in reality. Thus,
I think, Socrates, that if we let you go on speaking about this subject, you’ll never remember the one you set aside in order to say all this, namely, whether it’s possible for this constitution to come into being and in what way it could be brought about. I agree that, if it existed, all the things we’ve mentioned would be good for the city in which they occurred. And I’ll add some that you’ve left out. The guardians would be excellent fighters against an enemy because they’d be least likely to desert each other, since they know each other as brothers, fathers, and [d] sons, and call each other by those names. Moreover, if their women joined their campaigns, either in the same ranks or positioned in the rear to frighten the enemy and in case their help should ever be needed, I know that this would make them quite unbeatable. And I also see all the good things that they’d have at home that you’ve omitted. Take it that I agree [e] that all these things would happen, as well as innumerable others, if this kind of constitution came into being, and say no more on that subject. But rather let’s now try to convince ourselves that it is possible and how it is possible, and let the rest go.
This is a sudden attack that you’ve made on my argument, and you [472] show no sympathy for my delay. Perhaps you don’t realize that, just as I’ve barely escaped from the first two waves of objections, you’re bringing the third—the biggest and most difficult one—down upon me. When you see and hear it, you’ll surely be completely sympathetic, and recognize that it was, after all, appropriate for me to hesitate and be afraid to state and look into so paradoxical a view.
The more you speak like that, the less we’ll let you off from telling us how it’s possible for this constitution to come into being. So speak instead of wasting time. [b]
Socrates' response is understandably met with disbelief and perhaps no small amount of derision (or, at least, that has tended to be the historical response to Plato's proposal.) Socrates asserts that,
Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading men genuinely and adequately philosophize, that is, until political [d] power and philosophy entirely coincide, while the many natures who at present pursue either one exclusively are forcibly prevented from doing so, cities will have no rest from evils, Glaucon, nor, I think, will the human race. And, until this happens, the constitution we’ve been describing in [e] theory will never be born to the fullest extent possible or see the light of the sun. It’s because I saw how very paradoxical this statement would be that I hesitated to make it for so long, for it’s hard to face up to the fact that there can be no happiness, either public or private, in any other city.
This is at 473d/e. In the ensuing discussion, we learn a great deal about Plato's understanding of the nature of philosophy and its pursuit. What is philosophy, and how do we pursue it? In particular, what is the distinction Socrates draws between knowledge (epistēmē, Ancient Greek 'ἐπιστήμη') on the one hand, and mere belief (doxa, Ancient Greek 'δόξα', translated here as 'opinion'), and what points does he make in drawing it?