Lecture 4
CONSEQUENTIALISM IN GENERAL
All versions of consequentialism postulate what follows:
Consequentialism: The moral status of a given action (i.e. whether this action is right or wrong, obligatory or forbidden, permissible or supererogatory, etc.) depends solely on the good and bad consequences of this action (benefits and harms).
By contrast, theories that are versions of deontology postulate that he moral status of a given action depends (not on consequences of this action) but rather on the fact that an agent fulfilled her duty (in Greek deon) (on on related issues such as that someone's moral rights are respected).
Also by contrast, virtue ethics (e.g., a classical Natural Law theory) characterizes the moral status of actions in terms of what a virtuous person would do.
When you read about utilitarianism (and consequentialism in general), keep in mind the questions that all versions of consequentialism must address, namely:
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What counts as good consequences (benefits) and what counts as bad consequences (harms)? What kinds of things and situation are intrinsically good and bad?
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Are some values more important than others and always (or typically) take precedent over other values? (On this topic there is a debate between the quantitative hedonism (Bentham) and qualitative hedonism (Mill) and theorists who argue that other than pleasure things also can be intrinsically good.)
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Do harms and benefits of someone (some beings) count for more or less than harms and benefits of other beings? (E.g., do interests of people belonging to some race count for more than interests of other beings? Do animal harms matter?)
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Is it obligatory to maximize good consequences, minimize bad consequences, bring about the best balance of good and bad consequences, satisfice (i.e., to accept the first satisfactory option that comes close enough to the best outcome) or what?
Depending on how those questions are answered, we can develop different versions of consequentialism.
Here are some of the main Consequentialist principles:
Act Utilitarianism (AU): An act, A, is morally right if and only if A maximizes total (or social) utility (i.e., the utility of all). (J.J.C. Smart, Peter Singer (early in his career))
Classical Act Utilitarianism (CAU): An act, A, is morally right if and only if it brings about the best balance of pleasure and pain. (Bentham (?), Mill (?))
Rule Utilitarianism (RU): An act, A, is morally right if and only if it is consistent with the system of rules, R*, such that adopting and internalizing R* in a certain society would maximize utility within this society. (R.B. Brandt)
“Two Levels” Utilitarianism: In typical ordinary day situations, an act is right when it is consistent with the system of rules, R*, chosen (on utilitarian grounds) for ordinary situations. In non-typical (extra-ordinary) situations and/or when rules are in conflict, we use act-utilitarian considerations directly. (R.M. Hare; Peter Singer late in his career; Stef)
(Extreme) Ethical Egoism (EE): An act, A, is morally right if and only if A is in the best interest of the agent (the person who performs this act). (Ayn Rand)
(Extreme) Ethical Altruism (EA): An act, A, is morally right if and only if this act is in the best interest of people other than the agent.
The Best Interest Principle: If you are a lawyer, a doctor, or other professional hired by a client, always act in the best interest of your client (patient). (This principle has fairly limited scope and applies only to people (e.g., professionals) who Stan in fiduciary position to others.)
UTILITARIANISM IN GENERAL
Rachels introduces utilitarian ethics as follows:
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) made a powerful argument for a novel conception of morality. Morality, he urged, is not about pleasing God, nor is it about being faithful to abstract rules. Morality is about making the world as happy as possible. Bentham believed in one ultimate moral principle, namely, the Principle of Utility. This principle requires us, in all circumstances, to produce the most happiness that we can. (9th edition, p., 101, emphases added)
Mill offered the following formulation of what he called the most fundamental principle of morality:
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded‑namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain." (J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism")
All versions of utilitarian theory are based on the idea that we ought to try bring about the best "balance" of good and bad consequences (let's call them benefits and harms), taking into account the interests of all being affected by our actions. (The best balance means the sum of all benefits minus the sum of all harms.)
ACT (OR "DIRECT") UTILITARIANISM
There are various forms of utilitarian theory and various ways to formulate the Principle of Utility. Act-utilitarianism focusses on the evaluation of individual actions (so called, "action-tokens"). By contrast rule-utilitarianism wants as to adopt a system of rules and then use it to evaluate actions. Act-utilitarianism is, perhaps, the simplest form of utilitarianism. Thus we will start the discussion of utilitarian theory with a deeper look into this form of utilitarianism.
The Principle of Utility: There are several different ways in which the principle of utility can be formulated; here is one of them:
(AU1) An act, A, is morally right if and only if A maximizes total (or social) utility (i.e. the utility for all).
An act "maximizes social utility" if it produces the best overall consequences compared to other alternatives (other acts that could be performed). In other words:
(AU2) An act is morally right if and only if there is no alternative to this act that has higher utility.
The utility of an act is a function of bringing about desirable consequences (benefits) and avoiding undesirable consequences (harms). So, yet another firmulation of the utilitarian principle could go as follows:
(AU3) An act, A, is morally right if and only if it brings about the best balance of benefits and harms (or the best difference between the total sum of benefits and the total sum of harms).
Like other versions of consequentialism, utilitarianism requires some account of what counts as benefits and harms (or good and bad consequences). That is, it needs the theory of intrinsic value. Classical utilitarians, such as Bentham and Mill, frequently talk about pursuing happiness as our ultimate goal. In turn, they define happiness as pleasure and the absence of pain. In other words, they are hedonists. Hence, (on the assumption they are act utilitarians) their view can be stated as follows:
(AU classical) An act, A, is morally right if and only if it brings about the best balance of pleasure and pain.
(There are other ways to define happiness; e.g., see Aristotelian concept of eudaimonia explained below.)
Utilitarian theory is different from other versions of consequentialism, e.g., ethical‑egoism or (extreme) ethical‑altruism, or the best interest principle. Utilitarians take into account interests of all affected by some action. Ethical egoists and altruists are concern with only some of those beings. Roughly speaking, egoists are concerned with themselves (but not others), altruists are concerned with others (but not with themselves). The best interest principle has a very limited scope; it applies to specific situations that may occur between professionals and their clients. "How to work with matrix of utility" is a step by step guide explaining some differences between various consequentialist theories.
Some of the mistaken formulations of utilitarian principle
To recognize what utilitarianism implies, it's good to consider some of the mistaken ways in which the principle of utility is sometimes stated. Sometimes people formulate it as follows:
(?) An action is morally right if and only if it brings about more pleasure than pain (or more good than evil, or more benefits than harms).
This formulation ignores the fact that sometimes there may be some other alternative that a) brings the same amount of pleasure but less pain; or b) it brings about the same amount of pain but more pleasure; or c) it brings about more pleasure and less pain. To wit, this formulation of utilitarianism does not compare the act in question with other actions an agent can do instead.
Consider again this exercise and notice that each available option has overall positive utility (it brings about more good than evil). Yet only one of this options (alternatives) is correct, given utilitarian standards. For only one of them, maximizes utility (has the best/highest difference between the value of benefits and the value of harms). To conclude, to say that an action brings about more pleasure than pain does not mean that it maximizes utility. For there may be another alternative that brings about even more utility.
Here is another mistaken (even if popular) formulation of utilitarian principle:
(??) An action is morally right iff it brings about the greatest happiness for the greatest number.
The problem with this formulation is that, in many situations, it is impossible to use it. This is the case because (??) requires us to maximize two independent variables; namely, (a) the number of affected people and (b) the amount of happiness brought about by a certain act. These leads to immediate difficulties illustrated by the following example. Imagine that an agent can do one of two actions having the following consequences:
* The action #1 gives each of 10 people exactly 100 units of happiness (and no pain or unhappiness) for the grand total of 1000 units of utility.
* The action #2 gives each of 100 people exactly 5 units of happiness (and no pain) for the grand total of 500 units of utility.
What should be done in accordance with this formulation of the utilitarian principle? The act #1 affects only 10 people. It brings about, however, more happiness than the alternative. (that is, it brings about the greatest happiness.) The act #2 affects in a positive way 100 (the greatest number of people). But each of them receives a smaller amount of happiness (and the total happiness brought about is also smaller). So, what should we do? Should we benefit the greatest number of people? Or should we bring about the greatest amount of happiness? It is totally unclear what we ought to do in accordance with this mistaken formulation of the principle of utility.
In chapter 1 of his book, Rachels discusses the case of Baby Theresa and the following benefits argument applying to this case:
(???) If we can benefit someone, without harming anyone else, we ought to do so.
2) Transplanting Baby Theresa's organs would benefit many children without harming anyone.
3) Therefore, we ought to transplant Baby Theresa's organs.
The first premise, indicated by (???), encounters problems very similar to those encountered by (?). For example, sometimes we are in a situation when everything we can do is going to harm someone. The (???)-principle does not tell us what to do in such situations. Furthermore, suppose that I can do two (or more) actions, neither harming anyone. Suppose that the first action brings about some negligible benefits while the second action brings about lots of enormous benefits. The (???)-principle Implies that each of these actions is obligatory. This implication is highly implausible.
SOME OF THE MAIN FEATURES ASSOCIATED WITH THE UTILITARIAN THEORY
Consequentialism: Whether the action is right or wrong depends on the utility of this action in comparison with the utility of alternatives. The utility of an action is determined by its consequences.
Universal Inclusiveness: Classic utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-73) were hedonists. Thus, they included into the sphere of morality everyone able to feel pleasure or pain. This includes not only sentient humans but also sentient animals. As Jeremy Bentham observed in his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (cf. Rachels, sec. 7.4):
Other animals, which, on account of their interests having been neglected by the insensibility of the ancient jurists, stand degraded into the class of things. ... The day has been, I grieve it to say in many places it is not yet past, in which the greater part of the species, under the denomination of slaves, have been treated ... upon the same footing as ... animals are still. The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of skin is no reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or perhaps, the faculty for discourse? But a full grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? Why should the law refuse its protection to any sensitive being?... The time will come when humanity will extend its mantle over everything which breathes...
Egalitarianism (Impartiality) : Similar interests matter similarly. Jeremy Bentham incorporated the essential component of moral equality by means of the following formula, "Each to count for one and none for more than one." This is usually understood as implying that interests of all being who have interests must be taken into consideration and that similar interests must be treated similarly.
Many later utilitarians echoed this idea. For example, Henry Sidgwick (1838‑1900) expressed it in the following statement: "The good of any individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other." The main idea is that everyone is weighted the same in the utility calculations. Mary's happiness, for example, does not count any more or less than anyone else's. The happiness of ordinary folks is not less (or more) important than the happiness of kings or presidents.
Aggregation: We can aggregate (i.e., add) various benefits (pleasures) and harms (pains) experienced by various beings. Benefits and harms are commensurable. There is a common scale allowing to make such additions.
Maximization: In each case, that action is right which maximizes utility. That is, utilitarians postulate that we always must aim at the best, nothing less is morally satisfactory. By contrast, some versions of consequentialism require only that we come "close enough" to the maximum (they require satisfying rather than maximizing).
SOME ADDITIONAL FEATURES ASSOCIATED WITH UTILITARIAN THEORY
Act-Evaluation (a feature of "direct" utilitarianism): In their utility‑calculations act utilitarians consider the consequences of actions (as opposed to, e.g., the utility of adopting a certain system of rules). Scholars debate whether or not classical utilitarians were committed to act- or to rule-utilitarianism. We will put this controversy to one side. The debate between act- and rule-utilitarians is still alive in contemporary philosophical literature. Each theory has different merits and demerits.
Hedonism (a feature of classical utilitarianism): Classical utilitarians such as Bentham and Mill were hedonists. That is, they believed that the sole intrinsic good is pleasure and the sole intrinsic evil is pain. This feature of classical utilitarianism is discussed further below. Many contemporary utilitarians are not hedonists.
INTRINSIC VALUE AND HEDONISM: Both Bentham and Mill (so called, classical utilitarians) maintained that pleasure and only pleasure is intrinsically good and pain and only pain is intrinsically bad. Critics frequently challenged this tenet of utilitarianism claiming that such a view is worthy of swine. Here is Mill's response:
To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure‑no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit‑they designate as utterly mean and groveling; as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early period, contemptuously likened; and modern holders of the doctrine are occasionally made the subject of equally polite comparisons by its German, French, and English assailants.
The comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast's pleasures do not satisfy a human being's conceptions of happiness. Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification. I do not, indeed, consider the Epicureans to have been by any means faultless in drawing out their scheme of consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do this in any sufficient manner, many Stoic, as well as Christian elements require to be included. But there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation. It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc., of the former, that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than in their intrinsic nature.[...] It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone. (from Mill, “Utilitarianism”)
To wit, there are two kinds of hedonism. Bentham was a quantitative hedonist. That is, he believed that only the amount of pleasure and pain intrinsically matters. By contrast, Mill was a qualitative hedonist. That is, he believed that the quality of pleasure also intrinsically matters.
Let us remember that all versions of consequentialism (including utilitarianism) require some account of what counts as benefits and harms (or good and bad consequences). Classical utilitarians such as Bentham and Mill were hedonists; they were focussed on pleasure and pain. That is, their theory of happiness was different than, e.g., the theory of eudaimonia (happiness‑flourishing) offered by Aristotle, Aquinas, and others. Other utilitarians often consider other kinds of benefits and harms as well. "Intrinsic Value and the Isolation Test" provides a short summary of various view about what kind of things can be good or bad when taken in themselves.
It's good to remember that someone may reject hedonism and still embrace utilitarian ethics. That is, not all utilitarians are hedonists. (Also, not all hedonists are utilitarians.)
SOME PROBLEMS FOR ACT-UTILITARIANISM
Utilitarianism and supererogatory acts (act utilitarianism is too demanding):
Supererogatory acts can be defined as the acts that go beyond and above the call of duty. That is, it's right to do them; they are noble acts showing great generosity, benevolence, and even heroism. But it is not wrong to fail to do them.
Examples can be provided by acts of great self-sacrifice, or great generosity. Intuitively, it is morally great to do such acts but no one is required to perform them. Thus, they can be characterized as going beyon and above the call of duty.
But look at these sorts of acts from the point of view of act-utilitarianism. AU requires to bring about, in every situation, the very best possible balance of utility. Any action that brings about less than the best results, and thus fails to maximize utility, is not good enough (and thus, it is wrong). So, it seems that act utilitarianism does not allow for any supererogatory cats. We can now develop the following argument against act-utilitarianism:
An argument from Supererogatory Acts
1) If AU is true, then we always ought to maximize utility (failing to maximize utility is wrong).
2) Sometimes we are not required to do the best we can; that is, supererogatory acts are possible.
Therefore, 3) act-utilitarianism is false. [from (1) and (2)]
It seems that act‑utilitarians must bite a bullet in this case and agree that their theory imples there are no supererogatory acts. They may maintain only that some actions may be especially difficult. So, those difficult acts may be considered heroic. Most of us would have serious difficulties to do those heroic things. Still, if a heroic act maximizes utility then, by utilitarian standards, this act is obligatory. That is, they must admit that, strictly speaking, there are no supererogatory acts. Many critics of utilitarianism find this answer unsatisfactory.
Some consequentialist responses.
- First, consequentialist need to reject the requirement of "unconstrained" maximization and opt for some version of satisficing theory. Such a theory would require that the agent comes "close enough" to the maximally good outcome. Every such action would count as right. When the agent fails short of it, the action would be wrong. This would create a room for doing things above what is required, i.e., for supererogatory acts.
- Rule utilitarians (see below) could respond as follows. A system of rules that are chosen on consequentialist grounds does not require that we do heroic-supererogatory acts. So, we can sometimes do more than what is required by rules.
Non-consequentialist also could allow for supererogatory acts. In particular, deontologists could argue that we are required to follow the rules specifying our duties. But, also, sometimes we may do more than these rules require.
Utilitarianism and the problem of justice and equality:
The central idea of this objection is that, in some situations, utilitarian considerations are incompatible with the requirements of justice. The argument is based on the assumption that some acts have the following two features:
F1) they are gravely unjust; e.g. they violate human rights, go contrary to our duties, etc.; yet
F2) they maximize total (social) utility.
Critics argue that, because those acts are so gravely unjust they are also morally wrong. That is, our moral obligation may be to respect human right and to fulfill our duties rather than to maximize utility. Yet, by utilitarian standards, these gravely unjust acts are morally right. Hence, act utilitarianism is false. This argument can be formally stated as follows:
An injustice problem for act-utilitarianism:
1) If act-utilitarianism is true, then gravely unjust acts are morally right.
2) Gravely unjust acts are not right; they are morally wrong.
3) Therefore, act-utilitarianism is false.[from (1) and (2)]
Utilitarians have several ways they can attempt to use to reply to this objection. Here are some of them:
- A) There are hidden alternatives that do not require to violate justice.
- B) There are hidden utilities (e.g., unforeseen and long run consequences) that show that respect for justice in fact maximizes utility.
- C) Modify their theory of intrinsic value so it somehow reduces the value of results that are caused by injustice.
- D) Bite a bullet and reject the requirements of justice.
- E) Reject act-utilitarianism in favor of some other broadly consequentialist / utilitarian theory (e.g., rule utilitarianism).
RULE (INDIRECT) UTILITARIANISM was developed to handle some of the objections for the (direct) act utilitarianism. For example, it is not always clear what the utility of action is so it is hard to use the principle of utility directly. Furthermore, agents may be biased towards their own interests when they apply the principle of utility.
To avoid these perils, rule utilitarians do not evaluate actions directly. Rather, they decide first on a system of rules that will be used to evaluate actions. Utility calculus determines what rules ought to be chosen. In general, rule utilitarians would choose the system of rules that as a whole (and in a long run), if accepted and internalized by majority of people in a given society, would tend to promote utility in this society. Subsequently, so chosen rules are used to determine whether an action is right or wrong. That is rule‑utilitarianism is a two step theory:
Step 1: Choose the best system of moral rules; this is the system that is the most beneficial (in a long run) for the society to adopt and internalize.That is, choose the system of rules that, as a whole, maximizes utility.
Step 2: Evaluate the actions in accordance with the system so chosen.
That is, an action is right if it is in accordance with the system so chosen. The main idea of rule utilitarianism is that we ought to act in accordance with the rules even if and when, on a given occasion, breaking a rule may maximize utility.
Rachels develops a version of Rule Utilitarian theory in Chapter 13.
I develop aversion of mix consequentialist theory (in part act and in part rule utilitarianism) in my essay on utility and replaceability, pp. 98ff [ https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1176&con… ].