2. The following is not a consequentialist theory
A) ethical egoism
B) utilitarianism
C) (radical) ethical altruism
---> D) Ross’s system of prima facie duties
E) they are all versions of consequentialism
See outline about deontology.
3. The categorical imperative asserts that
A) one must always maximize benefits for a client or a patient.
B) one must always minimize harms for the client or patient.
C) one must always maximize benefits and minimize harms for the client or patient.
--> D) One must not treat any person merely as a mean
D) none of the above
4. Recall examples leading to the “injustice objection to utilitarianism.” Utilitarians could say that
A) the examples do not take into account long term utility;
B) the examples do not take into account all alternatives;
C) the examples do not take into account the fact that someone is used merely as a means to maximize utility;
--> D) A) and B) above;
E) all of the above
C) is not an option for a utilitarian theory but it could be used by Kant and his followers.
5. Recall examples leading to the “injustice objection to utilitarianism.” Kant could say that
A) the examples do not take into account long term utility;
B) the examples do not take into account negative utility;
C) the examples do not take into account all alternatives;
D) the examples do not take into account the fact that someone is used merely as a means to maximize utility;
E) all of the above.
Hint: Kantian deontology is not about benefits and harms. Rather, it is about respect for rational nature of humans.
6. One of the serious problems for Kant’s ethical theory (discussed in class) is that this theory
--> A) is not very clear about what it means to treat someone merely as a means;
B) allows someone to be treated as a means;
C) allows someone to be treated merely as a means;
D) none of the above.
7. According to the class lectures, the most plausible interpretation of the claim that “one is not used merely as a means” is this:
A) one is not harmed
B) one has explicitly consented to some form of treatment
--> C) a rational and well informed person explicitly consents to some treatment or, at least, a rational person would consent to some form of treatment if one were well informed
D) the action is best for all
8. Prima facie duties
A) can be in conflict with other prima facie duties;
B) can be overridden;
C) help us to understand why some actions are supererogatory;
--> D) A) and B)
E) all of the above.
9. According to Ross, the duty “all-told” (the duty all things considered) is
A) never to treat anyone merely as a means;
B) act in such a way that the maxim of your action can become a universal moral law;
C) the most stringent prima facie duty
D) all of the above
E) none of the above
See outline about deontology.
10. Negative rights
A) are central in consequentialist views
B) determine which acts are supererogatory
C) are correlated with positive duties
--> D) are correlated with negative duties
E) none of the above.
11. A positive right is nay be roughly characterized as
--> A) a right to be helped or offered some goods or benefits
B) a right not to be interfered with
C) any right correlated with prima facie duties
D) none of the above
12. Some examples of rights which, according to the lectures, may be most plausibly described as positive rights, were the following
A) the right to free speech and the right to free assembly
--> B) the right to health service and legal protection
C) all of the above
D) none of the above
In the case of those rights someone owes us something (i.e., access to health care and legal representation).
13. A negative duty is a duty not to interfere with the actions or decisions of others.
--> A) TRUE
B) FALSE
14. In class we discussed examples which involve using (sacrificing) one person to help other people. Such examples were used to show that
A) deontological theories are flawed
B) consequentialist theories (especially act-utilitarianism) may be flawed
C) hospitals must never use triage procedures
D) all of the above
E) none of the above.
I hope it's clear by now. If not, check out outlines about consequentialism (including teh review quiz).
According to Immanuel Kant,
“man and, in general, every rational being exists as an end in himself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will. In all his actions, whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, he must always be regarded at the same time as an end. [...] Beings whose existence does not depend on our will but on nature, if they are not rational beings, have only a relative worth as means and are therefore called "things"; on the other hand, rational beings are designated "persons," because their nature indicates that they are ends in themselves, i.e., things which may not be used merely as means. Such a being is thus an object of respect and, so far, restricts all [arbitrary] choice. Such beings are not merely subjective ends whose existence as a result of our action has a worth for us but are objective ends, i.e., beings whose existence in itself is an end. Such an end is one for which no other end can be substituted, to which these beings should serve merely as means. For, without them, nothing of absolute worth could be found, and if all worth is conditional and thus contingent, no supreme practical principle for reason could be found anywhere. " (Immanuel Kant, "The Categorical Imperative")”
15. In this passage, Kant draws a distinction between "things" (or "mere things") and "persons."
A) true B) false
16. According to Kant, persons are
A) all and only human beings;
--> B) all and only beings that have rational nature
C) unclear what Kant thinks about who counts as a person
D) none of the above.
On the otline about deontology I distinguished 4 different senses of the term person. I also argued that the classes of beings who are persons in each of those senses are not coextensive. So, you can be a person in one sense but not in other sense(s).
Kant also claims that we cannot help but to think that only persons (i.e., rational beings) exist as ends in themselves
17. Mill would reject this claim on the ground that
--> A) pleasure and the absence of pain may be an end in itself
B) desire satisfaction is the end in itself
C) flourishing may be an end in itself
D) all of the above
E) none of the above
18) A plausible interpretation of Kant’s ethics is that he requires of us
A) respect for all kind of wishes, no matter how whimsical they may be
--> B) respect for autonomy;
C) neither of the above
19) According to Kant, a difference between actions (e.g., winking) and mere bodily movements is (e.g., blinking) is that
A) actions (but not bodily movements) are purposeful or intentional;
B) actions (but not bodily movements) are based on internal principles that Kant calls “maxims”
C) actions (but not bodily movements) may have good and bad consequences
--> D) A) and B)
E) all of the above.
20) According to Kant
A) Hypothetical Imperatives link actions with goals we happen to desire while the Categorical Imperative asserts that some actions are absolutely and unconditionally necessary;
B) The Categorical Imperative links actions with goals we happen to desire while Hypothetical Imperatives assert that some actions are absolutely and unconditionally necessary;
C) neither of the above
Check out the definition og Hypothetical Imperative in Chapter 9 and on the outline about deontology.
21) Kant seems to be
A) an ethical absolutist and that is a problem for his theory;
B) an athical absolutist and that is a virtue of his theory;
C) an ethical non-absolutist (contextualist) who believes that one duty cabn override another duty;
D) all of the above;
E) none of the above.
See chapter about absolute rules (Chapter 9).
22) The example of inquiring murderer was used to show that
A) absolutism is defensible;
B) absolutist ethuics encounters serious difficulties;
C) neither absolutist not non-absolutist ethics is true;
D) none of the above.
A) true B) false
See Chapter 9. Hint: On the example of an inquiring murderer we can save an innocent person from a certain death. But, in order to achieve it, we must lie. What should we do? Well, what should we do if we have an absolute duty to save innocent life and also not to lie?
Kant considers the following example:
"Another man finds himself forced by need to borrow money. He well knows that he will not be able to repay it, but he also sees that nothing will be loaned him if he does not firmly promise to repay it at a certain time. He desires to make such a promise, but he has enough conscience to ask himself whether it is not improper and opposed to duty to relieve his distress in such a way. Now, assuming he does decide to do so, the maxim of his action would be as follows: When I believe myself to be in need of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know I shall never do so. Now this principle of self‑love or of his own benefit may very well be compatible with his whole future welfare, but the question is whether it is right. He changes the pretension of self‑love into a universal law and then puts the question: How would it be if my maxim became a universal law? He immediately sees that it could never hold as a universal law of nature and be consistent with itself; rather it must necessarily contradict itself. For the universality of a law which says that anyone who believes himself to be in need could promise what he pleased with the intention of not fulfilling it would make the promise itself and the end to be accomplished by it impossible; no one would believe what was promised to him but would only laugh at any such assertion as vain pretense."
23) In this example, a person would act on the following maxim: “When I believe myself to be in need of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know I shall never do so.”
--> A) true
B) false
24) Generalized form of this maxim is
“Whenever someone believes herself or himself to be in need of money, s/he will borrow money and promise to repay it, although s/he knows s/he shall never do so.”
--> A) true
B) false
25) Act utilitarians would argue against an act of borrowing money on the basis of false promise on the grounds that
A) it (i.e., the act of borrowing itself) fails to maximize utility
B) a rule allowing for such borrowing fails to max utility
C) a rule allowing for such borrowing leads to contradictions
D) all of the above;
E) none of the above.
Hint: Act utilitarians evaluate each act-token individually (i.e., in abstract of the rules or whether someone else will commit a similar act, and so on). Also, they anly take into account benefits and harms (good and bad consequences).
26) Rule utilitarians might argue against an act of borrowing money on the basis of false promise on the grounds that
A) it (i.e., the act of borrowing itself) fails to maximize utility
B) a rule allowing for such borrowing fails to max utility
C) a rule allowing for such borrowing leads to contradictions
D) all of the above;
E) none of the above
Hint: Rule utilitarians evaluate each act by, first, deciding on the system of rules and then, applying those rules to the act.
27) Kant might argue against borrowing an act of borrowing money on the basis of false promise on the grounds that
A) it (i.e., the act of borrowing itself) fails to maximize utility
B) a rule allowing for such borrowing fails to max utility
C) a rule allowing for such borrowing leads to contradictions
D) all of the above.
Hint: Kant evaluates each act by using a categorical imperative.
28) Suppose that some being has human DNA, and so, belongs to the species Homo Sapiens. Such a being is
--> A) a person in a biological sense of this term;
B) a person in a philosophical and theological sense of this term;
C) a person in a moral sense of this term;
D) a person in a legal sense of this term;
E) all of the above.
29) Suppose that some being has a rational nature, intellect, is self‑conscious, has autonomy, and has other related characteristic (e.g., developed linguistic skills necessary for abstract thinking). Such a being is
A) a person in a biological sense of this term;
--> B) a person in a philosophical and theological sense of this term;
C) both A) and B);
E) none of the above.
30) Suppose that some being is protected by moral rules, especially by the rule prohibitting killing him/her and has moral rights, including the right to life. Such a being is
A) a person in a biological sense of this term;
B) a person in a philosophical and theological sense of this term;
C) a person in a moral sense of this term;
D) a person in a legal sense of this term;
E) all of the above.
See outline about deontology.
31) Suppose that some being has legal rights. Such a being is
A) a person in a biological sense of this term;
B) a person in a philosophical and theological sense of this term;
C) a person in a moral sense of this term;
D) a person in a legal sense of this term;
E) all of the above.
See outline about deontology and Kant.
32) The following claim is true:
A) some human being (biological persons) are persons from the philosophical and theological points of view and some are not;
B) some persons from the philosophical and theological points of view are human beings and some are not;
---> C) both A) and B);
D) none of the above.
For example, Neanderthal Men, God (as understood in the Western theology), and arguably apes have all rational / intellectual nature but they do not belong to the species of Homo Sapiens. So, they are persons philosophically speaking but not human beins (not persons biologically speaking). By contrast, infants, small babies, and Baby Theresa (from Chapter 1) are human beings, i.e., biological persons, but they are not persons philosophically speaking because they cannot reason and have no intellect.
33) In class Stefan mentioned the following reasons that can be used to limit someone's freedom:
A) someone infringes on the important interests and freedom of others
B) someone harms himself
--> C) A) and B)
D) none of the above
A general Kantian idea is that, if we have to limit someones autonomy, it's best to limit it as little as possible. So, if we have to limit S's freedom a bit because, otherwise, he would very seriously infringe on freedom of others, such a limitation may be justified. (Because Kant was an absolutist, it is not entirely clear what he himself would think about limiting someone's freedom.)
34) Paternalistic intervention (action)
A) extends someone's freedom
B) limits someone's freedom for the sake of others
--> C) limits someone freedom for his/her own sake (i.e., to benefit someone whose freedom is limited)
D) all of the above
E) none of the above.
An example, forcing people to wear safetybelts is justified because it is good for them. Similarly, children should not drink or smoke because it is bad for them.